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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
LA VORA SPENDLOVE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
PAUL SHECHUCK, doing business as 
AMERICAN WINDOW CLEANING COM-
PANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
No. 7185 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE RELATING TO BILL OF 
EXCEPTIONS 
In this case the appeal on its merits will be without real 
substance if the Bill of Exceptions is stricken. The facts are 
such that the Supreme Court can not do otherwise than strike 
the Bill of Exceptions from the record in accordance with 
motion filed herein by the respondent on the 18th day of May, 
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1948. If the Bill of Exceptions is stricken, there .will be nothing 
before the court for consideration because the appellant did not 
raise any questions of law during the trial, and after the jury 
returned its verdict and judgment was entered thereon, he 
never at any time moved for a new trial. In any event without 
the evidence as contained in the Bill of Exceptions before the 
appellate court, appellant is really dangling in the air. It is 
essential, therefore, that the motion to strike appellant's Bill 
of Exceptions be first considered. 
The following facts are definitely a matter of record in the 
proceedings' of the case: 
1. The verdict of the jury was returned and filed on the 
23rd day of january, 1948. 
2. When the respondent rested her case, no motion for 
nonsuit was made. 
3. A motion for new trial was never made. 
4. A Bill of Exceptions was not prepared, served, settled, 
or filed within a thirty day period after the return of the ver-
dict of the jury, and the entry of judgment thereon. 
5. No application was made to the trial court within 
thirty days after the entry of judgment on the verdict for an 
extension of time within which to prepare, serve, settle, and 
file the Bill of Exceptions, and no extension of time was granted 
within said thirty day period, or at all. 
6. The purported Bill of Exceptions was served upon the 
attorneys for the respondent on the 24th day of April, 1948, more 
than ninety days after the entry of the judgment on the verdict. 
Up to that time no application for an extension of time within 
which to have the Bill of Exceptions prepared, served, settled, 
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or filed was applied for or granted, and no such extension has 
yet been applied for or granted. 
7. When the purported Bill of Exceptions was served 
upon the attorneys for the respondertt they were asked to stipu-
late that it was a true Bill of Exceptions, and that it might be 
settled and signed by the court. The respondent through her 
attorneys refused to sign said stipulation as prese~ted, but 
added thereto the following words, "subject, however, to all 
rights of the plaintiff to move to strike said Bill or to take such 
steps as provided by law because of failure of the defendant to 
prepare, settle, and file said Bill in the time and manner pro-
vided by law." 
8. Without any application being made to the court by 
the defendant and appellant to be relieved of his default, the 
trial judge on April 24, 1948, signed a certificate purporting to 
settled the Bill of Exceptions served upon the attorneys for 
the respondent, and the purported Bill of Exceptions was filed 
in the Supreme Court on the 5th day of May, 1948. 
10. In due course the respondent filed ~ motion in the 
Supreme Court in which she moved to strike from the records 
the purported Bill of Exceptions on the following grounds: 
( 1) That said Bill of Exceptions was not prepared, served, 
and filed within the time required by law; (2) That no extension 
for the service and filing of said Bill of Exceptions' was ever 
requested or granted during the time required by law; (3) 
That no motion was made by the appellant during the time 
required by law for new trial in the above entitled case after the 
entry of judgment on the verdict of the jury in said case; ( 4) 
That the said Bill of Exceptions was served, settled, and filed 
after the expiration for the time for appeal herein and over 
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the protest of the plaintiff through her counsel. 
11. That on the lOth day of May, 1948, after the filing of 
the purported Bill of Exceptions in the Supreme Court, the at-
torney for the appellant served upon the attorneys for the 
respondent a certain paper designated Application for Relief 
in which the attorney for the appellant moved to be relieved of 
his default for failure to serve and file his Bill of Exceptions 
within the time required by law upon the grounds of inadver-
tence, mistake, and excusable neglect, said motion specifically 
stating "this motion is made and will be supported upon the · 
affidavit of Ira A. Huggins, attorney for said defendant." With 
the Application for Relief was served an affidavit by Ira A. 
Huggins in which he stated that a verdict was entered in favor 
of the respondent and against the appellant on january 23, 
1948; that about two weeks thereafter, the affiant ordered 
preparation of a transcript and Bill of Exceptions from a court 
reporter; the transcript and Bill of Exceptions were completed 
and· delivered about the 16th day of April,' 1948; that said Bill 
of Exceptions was serv_ed upon the plaintiff's attorneys on 
April 24, 1948; that said Bill of Exceptions was signed by the 
trial judge on April 24, 1948 and filed with the trial court April 
29, 1948; that the affiant failed to apply for an extension of 
time within which to prepare and file his Bill of Exceptions 
because he misread Section 104-39-4, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, and thought that he had thirty days from the service of 
notice of appeal in which to prepare and file his Bill of Excep-
tions. 
• 
12. The respondent filed objections to the granting of the 
application upon the grounds that the court was without juris-
diction to grant any relief; that the affidavit filed in support of 
the motion does not set forth facts sufficient to constitute 
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grounds for relief; that no motion for new trial was made and 
that no Bill of Exceptions could have been filed; and that no ex-
tension of time was requested or granted for the filing of a 
Bill of Exceptions until after more than ninety days had ex-
pired after the entry of judgment on the verdict. 
12. The court heard the application of the appellant to be 
relieved of default on the 18th day of May, 1948 and made pur-
ported findings, conclusions of law and an order. From the 
courts findings these things appear: 
(1) No motion for new trial was ever made; (2) Approxi-
mately two weeks after the entry of judgment on the verdict, 
the appellant's attorney was directed by the appellant to effect 
an appeal; that immediately upon being directed to take the 
appeal the attorney for appellant ordered a transcript and Bill 
of Exceptions from the court reporter; that appellant's attorney 
misread the law and thought he had thirty days from the day 
that he served his notice of appeal in which to prepare and 
settle his Bill of Exceptions. 
13. Based upon the said findings the trial judge signed 
an order purporting to relieve the appellant of his default, but 
did not enter an order extending the time of appellant to serVe, 
settle, and file a Bill of Exceptions, and that after the entry 
of the purported order relieving defendant of his default no 
Bill of Exceptions was served or filed. 
Now before attempting to argue this case on its merits, 
or to make any statement concerning what is shown by the 
evidence contained in the Bill of Exceptions, we present the 
following argument in support of our motion to strike the BilJ 
of Exceptions: 
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I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT POWER TO SET-
TLE THE PURPORTED BILL OF EXCEPTIONS ON APRIL 
24, 1948. 
The law is definitely settled in the State of Utah "in an 
unbroken line of decisions that in case the party who desires 
an extension of time fails to apply for such extension at some 
time before the statutory time, or any extension thereof, has 
expired, the district court or judge is without power thereafter 
to allow, settle and sign a bill of exceptions." Moyle v. McKean 
et al, 49 Utah 93, 162 Pac. 63. 
The beginning point in the consideration of this question, 
of course, is the statute (Section 104-39-4, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943) which reads in part as follows: 
"When a party desires to have exceptions taken at a 
trial set~led in a bill of exceptions, he may, within thirty 
days after the entry of judgment, if the action was tried 
with a jury, or after the service of notice of the entry of 
judgment, if the action was tried without a jury, or after 
service of notice of the determination of motion for a new 
trial, prepare a draft of the bill and serve the same, or a 
copy thereof, upon the adverse party." 
This was formerly Section 6969, Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1917, and prior to that time was Se.ction 3005, Compiled Laws 
of Utah, 1907. It is Sec. 104-39-4 in Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933. 
In the case of Tooele Improvement Company vs. Hoffman, 
44 Utah 532, 141 Pac. 744, the Utah Supreme Court in constru-
ing the 1907 statute said: 
"This court has repeatedly held that while the District 
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Court may, before the statutory period for serving the bill 
of exceptions has elapsed, extend the time 'upon good 
cause shown,' as provided in Section 3329, it is without 
authority to grant such extension if, at the time the appli-
cation is made, the statutory time for service of the bill 
has fully expired. Butter vs. Lampson, 29 Utah 439, 82 Pac. 
473; Bryant vs. Kunkel, 32 Utah 377, 90 Pac. 1079; War-
nock Ins. Agency vs. Peterson Inv. Co., 35 Utah 542, 101 
Pac. 699; Metz vs. Jackson, 43 Utah 496, 136 Pac. 784. On 
authority of these cases, which we think were correctly 
decided, the motion to strike the bill of objections is sus-
tained." 
In the case of Independent Gas & Oil Co. vs. Beneficial Oil 
Co. et al, 71 Utah 348, 266 Pac. 267, the question of serving a 
bill of exceptions within the prescribed period under the pro-
visions of Section 6969, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, with 
other applicable Sections from the same code, was before the 
court. Speaking through Mr. justice Hansen, the court said: 
"The following provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917 
fix the time within which a bill of exceptions shall be pre-
pared and served. We quote only such part of the laws as 
are deemed material to the question here involved: 
'Sec. 6969. When a party desires to have exceptions 
taken at a trial settled in a bill of exceptions, he may, within 
thirty days after the entry of judgment if the action were 
tried with a jury, or after service of notice of the entry of 
judgment if the action were tried without a jury, or after 
service of notice of the determination of a motion for a 
new trial, prepare a draft of a bill and serve the same, or 
a copy thereof, upon the adverse party. * * *' 
'Sec. 7023. When an act to be done as provided in this 
Code relates to * * * the preparation, service, filing, or 
presentment of bills of exception, or of amendments there-
to, * * * the time allowed by this Code may be extended, 
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upon good cause shown, by the court in which the action 
is pending, or by a judge thereof.' 
'Sec. 6619. The court may, in furtherance of justice, 
* * * upon such terms as may be just, relieve a party or his 
- legal representative from a judgment, order, or other pro-
ceeding taken against him through his mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.' 
"After the time fixed by Comp. Laws Utah 1917, No. 
6969, had expired, without any further extension of time as 
provided by Comp. Laws 1917, No. 7023, the district court 
was without jurisdiction or power to grant further time 
until the defendants had first been relieved from their 
default in failing to keep alive the time in which to prepare 
and serve their bill of exceptions. Such has been the re-
.peated and uniform holdings of this court. Butter v. Lam-
son, 29 Utah 439, 82 P. 473; Bryant v. Kunkel, 32 Utah 377, 
90 P. 1079; Warnock Ins. Agency v. Peterson lnv. Co., 35 
Utah 542, 101 P. 699; Metz v. jackson, 43 Utah 496, 136 P. 
784; Tooele Imp. Co. v. Hoffman, 44 Utah 532, 141 P. 744; 
Allen v. Garner, 45 Utah 39, 143 P. 228; McEwan v. Ander-
son, 50 Utah 317, 167 P. 685; State v. Martin, 149 Utah 136, 
164 P. 500. 
"In order to invoke the jurisdiction or power of the 
district court to revive and grant further time in which 
defendants may prepare and serve their bill of exceptions 
under 'the provisions of Comp .. Laws of Utah 1917, Sec. 
6619, it was necessary for them to make a proper applica-
tion and showing. Morgan v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 29 Utah 92, 
74 P. 523; Felt v. Cook, 31 Utah 299, 87 P. 1092; Tooele 
Imp. Co. v. Hoffman, and Allen v. Garner, supra." 
In the case of Findlay v. National Union Indemnity Co., 
85 Utah 110, 38 P. 2d 760, this court went rather extensively 
into the question relating to the time for the service of a bill 
of exceptions. Speaking through justice Moffat, the court said: 
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"In the instant case the cause was tried, judgment en-
tered, and a mo.tion for a new trial filed and heard. The 
motion was denied on the 15th day of March, 1932. Notice 
thereof was served by the plaintiff on the 16th of March 
and filed with the clerk of the court the day following. Thus 
under the statute the time within which the bill of excep-
tions must be prepared and served started to run by the 
service of the notice of determination· of the motion for a 
new trial. Comp. Laws of Utah 1917, Sec. 6969, as amended 
by Laws Utah 1925, c. 51. That statute, by which this case 
is controlled, now amended and superseded by R. S. Utah 
1933, 104-39-4, reads: 
'When a party desires to have exceptions taken at a 
trial settled in. a bill of exceptions, he may, within thirty 
days after the entry of judgment if the action were tried 
with a jury, or after service of a notice of the entry of 
judgment if the action were tried without a jury, or after 
service of notice of the determination of a motion· for a 
new trial or in ~ase an appeal is taken before the bill of 
exceptions is settled service of the notice aforesaid shall 
not be necessary anq the appellant shall, within thirty days 
after service of his notice of appeal, prepare a draft of a 
bill and serve the same, or a copy thereof, upon the adverse 
party. * * *' · 
"When a judgment is entered, the losing party has a 
right of appeal. This is a transient right, and, if not per-
fected within the six-month period, the right of appeal is 
lost and ceases to exist. R. S. 1933, 104-41-2. As a part of 
the record on appeal; the bill of exceptions may or may 
not be incorporated therein, depending J.Ipon the nature of 
the question sought to be reviewed therein. The right to 
have the bill of exceptions included in the record on appeal 
is given not without limitations, hut is contingent upon 
the doing of the prescribed acts and within the time fixed. 
When a party desires to have the exceptions he has taken 
at the trial settled in a bill of exceptions, he may within 
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thirty days after the entry of judgment, if the action were 
tried to a jury and no motion for a n~w trial has been in-
terposed, have his bill of exceptions settled, or, if the action 
were tried to the court, he may have the bill of exceptions 
settled within thirty days after the service of notice of the 
entry of judgment, or, if the cause were tried to the court 
or to the court sitting with a jury and a motion for a new 
trial interposed, he may have his bill of exceptions settled 
and signed within thirty days after the service of notice 
of the determination of the motion for a new trial. 
"Before the amendment of 1925, the foregoing were 
the only limitations, except the ninety-day limitation here-
inbefore referred to, relating to the preparing, serving, set-
tling, and signing of the bill of exceptions. Under the pro-
visions of the statute, the time limitations began running 
automaticalfy upon the entry of a judgment ,on the verdict, 
when the cause was tried to a jury, if no motion for a new 
trial had been filed within time. By the other provisions of 
the statute prior to the amendment, service of a notice of 
the entry of judgment or service of notice of determina-
tion of the motion for a new trial was necessary to start 
the running of the t'ime limitation relating to the settle-
ment of the bill of exception·s. The 1925 amendment added 
to the section (Comp. Laws 1917, Sec. 6969, as amended 
by Laws 1925, c. 51) the words: 
'Or in case an appeal is taken before the bill of excep-
tions is settled service of the notice aforesaid shall not be 
necessary (to start the time to run) and the appellant shall, 
within thirty days after service of his notice of appeal, pre-
pare a draft of a bill and serve the same, or a copy thereof, 
upon the adverse party." (Parenthetical phrase added.) 
"Counsel for appellant insists that the amendment last 
above quoted gives a fourth and alternative way by which 
the parties to an appeal may start the time to run within 
which the preparation and settlement of the bill must be 
made, regardless of whether the notices referred to have 
10 
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been served. We think counsel is in error in this convention. 
"In passing, it might be of value especially as to cases 
arising in the future and for the purpose of indicating the 
court's position upon this question to advert to the further 
amendment of the same part of the section involved herein 
as now contained in R. 8_. 1933, 104-39-4. In the 1933 re-
vision the section is now divided into six subparagraphs. " 
The ninety-day limitation heretofore referred to has been 
omitted and repealed; some other omissions have been 
made. Except for the omissions we think the meaning and 
purpose of the statute have not been changed. Subpara-
graph (2) of the amended section now 104-39-4, reads: 
'In case an appeal is taken before the bill of exceptions 
is settled, service of the notices aforesaid shall not be nec-
essary and time shall run from service of his notice of 
appeal.' 
"Adverting now to the construction of that part of 
the section of the statute in question: It is to be observed 
that fundamentally the statute is procedural in nature and 
limitational in purpose and effect. It requires a notice to 
set the time running in all cases tried to the court with or 
without a motion for a new-trial and in cases tried to a 
jury when a motion for a new trial has been filed and de-
termined. Time begins to run automatically upon entry of 
judgment on the verdict if no motion for a new trial has 
been filed, and in any case by the service of notice of 
appeal. When the time limitation fixed by the statute has 
been started running by any one of the methods provided 
by the statute, except by notice of appeal, may such time 
as has elapsed be cut off and the time started to run anew 
and from the date of the services of notice of appeal? We 
think it was neither the purpose of the statute nor the in-
tention of the Legislature in making the amendment to thus 
permit an extension of time when once started as provided 
by the statute: 'In case an appeal is taken before the bill 
of exceptions is settled service of the notices aforesaid 
11 
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shall not be necessary' to start the time running within 
which to prepare and serve the bill of exceptions. When 
the time has once been started by the service of the re-
quired notice, it may no more be cut off by serving and 
filing a subsequent notice of appeal than the time could be 
similarly cut off in case of entry of judgment on a verdict 
where no notice is necessary in the absence of a motion 
for a new trial. The appeal method of starting the time to 
run is applicable only when time has not already been 
started to run either by notice or by the provision of the, 
statute without notice. 
"It is conceded by counsel that the order of April 29, 
1932, extending the time for sixty days after May 1, 1932, 
in which to prepare, serve, have settled, and file the bill of 
exceptions, was entered without any proceedings under 
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 6619, to relieve appellant from 
its default. The notice of determination of the motion for 
a new trial was served on March 16, 1932. This notice 
started the time running within which the settlement of 
the bill must be made, unless the time was extended by 
proper proceedings as by the statute provided. The order 
of April 29, 1932, was more than thirty days after the ser-
vice of the notice. No application was made to the district 
court, and no showing suggested to that court for relief. 
In the absence of an application to be relieved and showing 
justifying such relief, the district court lost jurisdiction to 
make the order of April 29, 1932, extending the time within 
which the bill of exceptions could be settled by that court. 
"It being clear under the statute that the time within 
which' to prepare and serve the bill of exceptions began 
running on March 16, 1932, the date of service of the notice 
of determination of the motion for a new trial, the doctrine 
heretofore laid down by this court in the case of Inde-
pendent Gas & Oil Co. v. Beneficial Oil Co., 71 Utah 348, 
266 P. 267, 269, and cases therein cited, it determinative of 
the matter. 
12 
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See following additional cases: Keller vs. Chournos, 95 U t. 
25, 76 P. 2nd 625; Foxley v. Gallagher, 55 Ut. 298, 185 Pac. 775; 
In re Peterson, 87 Ut. 144, 48 Pac. 2nd 468; Prunty v. Equitable 
Life Assur., 86 Ut. 236, 42 P. 2nd 219; Metz v. jackson, 43 Ut. 
496. 
It appears conclusively, therefore, that the purported bill 
of exceptions served on April 24, 1948, and signed by the trial 
judge on the same date was a nullity. 
Unless, therefore, appellant's right to serve and file a bill 
of exceptions was revived in some manner, the alleged bill of 
exceptions must be stricken. See Warnock Ins. Agency v. Peter-
son, 35 Ut. 542. 
II. 
THERE HAVE BEEN NO VALID PROCEEDINGS BY 
WHICH APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO PREPARE, SERVE AND 
FILE A BILL OF EXCEPTIONS HAS BEEN RESTORED. 
If it be conceded for the purpose of this argument that 
there are cases in which relief may be granted under the pro-
visions of Section 104-14-4, U. C. A. 1943, the instant case surely 
cannot be brought within that category. The Utah State Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held that while ex parte extensions 
for the preparation, serving and filing of bills of exception 
are granted readily, and the reason for the extensions is seldom, 
if ever, questioned, where the application for the extension is 
made within the thirty-day period, or some timely extension 
thereof, yet there is a difference where application for exten-
sion is first made after more than thirty days have lapsed. 
Keller vs. Chournos, 95 Ut. 25, 76 P. 2nd 626; Prunty vs. Equi-
table Life etc. 86 Ut. 236, 42 P. 2nd 219. 
13 
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In the Prunty case, supra, the court citing with approval the 
holding in Tooele Improvement Co. vs. Hoffman, 44 Ut. 532, 
held that: 
Where an applicant seeks relief under the provisiOns 
of 104-14-4, "the court is without jurisdiction to grant re-
lief, unless an application and showing is made to the court 
upon which it can base findings for or against the appli-
cation. * * * The findings and order, when properly served 
and made a part of the record on appeal, may then be re-
viewed by .this court upon the application of either party 
the same as any other ruling in the case. For these reasons, 
therefore, it is necessary that the application and showing 
be sufficient in form and substance to authorize the court 
to act." Tooele Improvement Co. v. Hoffman, supra. 
The court is not empowered to use an imaginary or insuf-
ficient reason to set aside a,n applicant's default, but must re-
quire substantial grounds. Any order setting aside a default 
must be based upon adequate findings. See Chournos case, 
supra; Findlay vs. National Ind. Co., 85 Ut. 110. 
If it be assumed that a proper application was made for 
reinstatement of the appellant's rights in this case (which is 
contrary to the facts as will be pointed out) yet no showing was 
made entitling appellant to relief. 
Moyle vs. McKean, 49 Utah 93, is controlling in the instant 
case, even if we indulge the presumption that a proper applica-
tion for relief was made. In the McKean case the court pointed 
out that if application is made to be relieved from a default 
such as we are considering, certain procedure must be fol-
lowed, and an adequate showing made. The court stated the 
law as follows: 
"The applicant must, however, make a proper showing 
of facts from which the court is authorized to find that 
14 
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the delay and failure to act timely on his part is excusable, 
and the court, or judge, must make findings of that fact 
which, at the instance of the opposing party, may be re-
viewed by this court. The district court, or judge, under 
Section 3005, may not assume arbitrary power and allow 
and sign a bill of exceptions out of time, but can do so only 
when good and sufficient cause is made to appear. In this 
case, as in Tooele Improvement Co. v. Hoffman, supra, 
the facts upon which appellants' counsel rely are wholly 
insufficient to authorize any court or judge to grant relief 
under Section 3005. While one of appellants' counsel has 
filed a voluminous affidavit in support of his application, 
yet practically the only facts upon which counsel relies, and 
upon which the district judge apparently acted in allowing 
and signing the proposed bill are as follows: 
"That it has been some years since affiant in person 
has been charged with the taking and perfection of an 
appeal, such matters having been committed to other mem-
bers of the firm of which affiant is a member. 
'That affiant, knowing that the law permitted him six 
months after judgment within which to take the initial step 
to appeal, namely, the filing of a notice, and, for the 'time, 
overlooking the requirement that the trouble and expense 
(in this case $240) of procuring and serving a bill of ex-
ceptions must be undertaken months before it is necessary 
to serve a notice of appeal, or, in the alternative, that the 
discretion of the trial judge should be invoked in order to 
secure such extensions of time as might be neces~~ry to 
permit a party to determine whether or not to appeal or to 
procure his record, inadvertently mistook and overlooked 
the time within which the service of the bill should be 
made, affiant believing that such service and filing would 
be timely if made so as to permit the transcript to be filed 
in the Supreme Court within thirty days after the perfec-
tion of the bill as provided in rule II of the Supreme Court 
rules. 
15. 
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'Affiant further states that he was induced to believe 
he was moving within the proper time because of the phy-
sical impossibility in this case, and in all other cases where 
the transcript is voluminous and the appeal is on the entire 
record, of procuring and serving a draft of the bill of ex-
ceptions within thirty days after notice of judgment.' 
"The district judge made no findings, and, apart from 
'the foregoing statements, the record is destitute of any-
thing from which we can determine what induced him to 
act. The facts presented by counsel as an excuse for a 
delay of more than six months in preparing and serving 
their proposed bill of exceptions were, therefore, as pointed 
out in Felt v. Cook, 31 Utah 299, 87 Pac. 1092, and in 
Tooele Improvement Co. v. Hoffman, supra, wholly in-
sufficient to set in motion the jurisdiction or power of the 
district judge, or to authorize him to act. Appellant's coun-
sel, however, invoke the rule that we must presume that 
the district court acted regularly and for sufficient cause. 
That rule has no application here, since the record affirma-
tively shows upon what grounds the court based its action. 
Where the record speaks, presumptions may not be in-
dulged." 
In the case of Keller v. Chournos, 95 Utah 25, 76 P. 2nd 
626, proceedings were instituted by the appellant to be relieved 
of his default for failure to serve and file his bill of exceptions 
within the time required by law. 
In that case a motion for a new trial was denied by the 
court on August 10, 1936. Notice of the ruling denying the 
motion for new trial was served on August 12, 1936. 
"Thereafter, counsel for plaintiff secured an extension 
of time, in which to prepare and settle the bill of exceptions 
on the appeal until November 1, 1936." 
The Supreme Court took the following position: 
"Summarizing what was stated before the trial court 
16 
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as a basis for the relief sought, it appears that judgment 
was entered July 13, 1936; motion for a new trial overruled 
August 10, 1936; and notice served of the overruling of 
the motion for a new trial August 12, 1936. On July 13, 
1936, after the decree had been entered, counsel for ap-
pellant directed the court reporter to prepare a transcript, 
and requested him to take care of obtaining necessary 
extensions of time, which was agreed to by the reporter. 
Accordingly on August 29, 1936, he obtained an order 
giving appellant until November 1, 1936, to prepare and 
serve the bill. On July 14, 1936, the reporter, by letter, 
asked counsel for a deposit of $100 in part payment for 
preparing the transcript and on July 15, 1936, counsel for 
plaintiff replied: 
'As soon as the situation seems to warrant it, I shall 
have Mr. Keller advance $100.00 to apply upon the record.' 
"Whether right or wrong, the reporter seems to have 
assumed that this letter amounted to a cancellation of the 
order for the transcript and therefore took no further action 
in the matter. Early in November, 1936, counsel for de-
fendant called the attention of counsel for plaintiff to the 
fact that his time for preparing and filing his· bill of ex-
ceptions had expired and suggested a payment of the judg-
ment. Notwithstanding this information and request, it 
was not until sometime in January, 1937, that counsel for 
plaintiff directed the reporter to proceed with the prepara-
tion of the transcript. It appears that the transcript was 
completed and delivered on February 27, 1937. It was not 
until June 10, 1937, that counsel for plaintiff took any ac-
tion seeking to obtain relief from his default. The court 
has jurisdiction under provisions of section 104-14-4, R. S. 
Utah 1933, to grant relief sought in this case upon a proper 
showing. This section provides that the court may, 'upon 
such terms as may be just, relieve a party or his legal rep-
resentative from a judgment, order or other proceeding 
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, sur-
17 
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prise, or excusable neglect.' 
"It has been held that the preparation and settlement 
of a bill of exceptions is a proceeding in a pending action, 
and that in case a party has failed to prepare, serve, and 
file his bill of exceptions within the statutory time he may 
apply to the court for relief; and, if he can show that he 
failed to do so through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect, under the section above quoted, the 
court could relieve him and make an order settling the bill 
of exceptions to be served and filed although the statutory 
time had fully elapsed. 
"There is a difference, however, between being re-
lieved before the time for settlement has elapsed and after. 
In the first instance, it is ~ matter of discretion of the 
court and is us~ally upon request ex parte granted; in the 
latter, the court's jurisdiction must be properly invoked 
and proof submitted and findings made showing cause for 
relief. In the case of Tooele Improvement Co. v. Hoffman, 
44 Utah 532, 141 P. 744, 745, in construing the above-quoted 
section, Comp. Laws Utah, 1907, section 3005, carried into 
Comp. Laws, 1917, Sec. 6619, then as section 104-14-4, R. S. 
Utah 1933, this court said: 
'The court is without jurisdiction to grant relief, unless 
an application and showing is made to the court upon which 
it can base findings for or against the application. If the 
court finds the showing sufficient to authorize the relief 
sought, it should make an order allowing the proposed bill 
of exceptions to be served, and, if it finds the showing in-
sufficient, make an order to the contrary. The findings and 
order, when properly served and made a part of the record 
on appeal, may then be reviewed by this court upon the 
application of either party the same as any other ruling in 
the case.' · 
"It will thus be seen that we may then review both the 
findings and order. 
18 
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"In the instant case no findings were made upon which 
to base the order, and an examination of the evidence indi-
cates that there was no proper showing justifying a finding 
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 
State·v. Bartholomew, 85 Utah 94, 38 P. 2nd 753, and cases 
cited, are in point." 
The case of Prunty v. Equitable Life, supra (86 Utah 236) 
is also in point. In that case application to be relieved from 
default was also filed. In the words of the Supreme Court, 
"The affidavit states that a stenographer was in-
structed to file the bill of exceptions, that affiant went on 
a vacation, and by inadvertence and mistake the bill was 
not filed in time. No findings were made upon the so-Galled 
application or motion to be relieved. Indeed, it would seem 
difficult without more to frame anything worthy of the 
name of a finding. The court's order recited that for good 
cause shown, the applicant was relieved from default if 
any existed. This brings nothing in the nature of a finding 
here for review and in any view of the matter is insuf-
ficient. Tooele Improvement Co. v. Hoffman, supra;· In-
dependent Gas & Oil Co. v. Beneficial Oil Co., supra; Mor-
gan v. Oregon S. L. R. Co,, 27 Utah 92, 74 P. 523; Felt v. 
Cook, 31 Utah 299, 87 P. 1092; and Allen v. Garner, supra." 
It will thus be seen that our Supreme Court has definitely 
decided that while the power resides in the court to relieve a 
party of his default for failure to prepare and serve a bill of 
exceptions within the time prescribed by statute, yet proceed-
ings must be instituted in a proper way to obtain relief. There 
must be substantial evidence of inadvertence and excusable 
neglect. It doesn't lie within the discretion of the court to find 
~xcusable neglect unless there is real evidence to support such 
a finding. 
Let us now examine what happened in the instant case. 
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The district court had no jurisdiction to grant an extension 
of time to the appellant after the 23rd day of February, 1948, 
since the judgment was entered on the verdict on January 23, 
1948, as shown in the judgment roll, page 040. However, no 
proposed bill of exceptions was served until April 24, 1948. In 
the meantime no application for an. extension had been made 
or granted, and no motion for new trial had been made. Ob-
viously, therefore, under the holdings of the Utah Supreme 
Court hereinbefore cited, the purported service and settlement 
of the bill of exceptions on April 24, 1948, were null and void. 
It was not until the lOth day of May, 1948, that the attorney 
for the appellant served upon the attorney for the respondent 
a paper which was designated "APPLICATION FOR RELIEF" 
(See page 3, Supplemental Bill of Exceptions). 
That application for relief mo~ed "for relief, as provided 
in Section 104-14-4, U. C. A., 1943, because of the failure of 
the defendant to serve and file his bill of exceptions in the 
above entitled case within the time provided for by Section 
104-39-4, U C. A., 1943, upon the grounds of inadvertehce, mis-
take and excusable neglect. This motion is made and will be 
supported upon the affidavit of Ira A. Huggins, attorney for 
said def~ndant." There was nothing in the application to indicate 
that the appellant intended to do anything except support .his 
motion by the affidavit which was served with the motion. 
In the affidavit (See Pages 1 and 2 of Supplemental Bill 
of Exceptions) the attorney for the appellant sets forth that 
the verdict of the jury was returned on January 23, 1948; "that 
approximately two weeks thereafter, affiant ordered the prep-
aration of a transcript and bill of exceptions in the case from 
Simon Barlow, the court reporter in said court in said cause." 
That the affiant received the transcript about April 16, 1948; 
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that he submitted it to plaintiff's attorney about April 24, 1948. 
At this point the affiant overlooks an obvious and important 
part of the record. He says that a stipulation was signed to the 
effect that the transcript as served upon the attorney for res-
pondent was true and correct and might be settled by the judge 
as such. However, the stipulation now in the record contains 
the following words in the handwriting of one of the attorneys 
for the respondent: 
"Subject, however, to all rights of plaintiff to move to 
strike said bill or to take such steps as provided by law 
because of the failure of defendant to prepare, settle and 
file said bill in the time and manner provided by law." 
Obviously, up to that point in the affidavit there is nothing 
warranting any relief from default. Affiant then proceeds in 
his affidavit to state in substance that the reason he didn't 
apply to the court for an extension of time within the thirty-day 
period was because he misunderstood the provisions of sub-
division 2 of Section 104-39-4, U C. A., 1943, and thought he 
had thirty days after service of his notice of appeal in which 
to serve and file his bill of exceptions, and that he didn't become 
aware of his mistake until he rechecked the statute on April 21, 
1948. He doesn't state, however, what caused him to put a dif-
ferent meaning into the statute on April 21, than he got out 
of it about the 10th of February. 
The last paragraph of the affidavit merely contains a 
statement to the effect that the affiant believes he has grounds 
for appeal and that the case can't properly be reviewed without 
a bill of exceptions. 
In substance, therefore, all that the attorney for the appel-
lant says in his affidavit is that he misunderstood the obvious 
provisions of the law as contained in Section 104-39-4, U. C. A. 
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1943, relating to the p~epatation, serving and filing of bills of 
exception. 
As early as 1934, the Utah Supreme Court passed upon this 
very question in the case of Findlay v. ~ational Union Indemnity 
Co., 85 Ut. 110, cited at length in the previous pages of this 
brief. The provisions of the statute now under consideration 
which were then contained in R. S. of Utah, 1933, were discussed 
and definitely construed. In that case it was specifically urged 
that the statute gave thirty days from the date of the service 
o·f the notice of appeal in which to serve and file the bill of 
exceptions. The court held that the contention was erroneous, 
and that all the statute meant was that if the time had not 
already started to run that the filing of a notice of appeal 
started the time to pass for the filing of the bill of exceptions. 
If to ignore a law which is so well established comprises inad-
vertence and excusable neglect then to ignore or misinterpret 
any and all other provisions of law could at any time be urged 
as grounds for relief. 
But, let us look a bit further into this case. There is nothing 
in the application of the appellant requesting an order permit-
ting the serving and filing of the bill of exceptions within a 
specified time. Nor does the order of the court grant the ap-
pellant any additional time, or fix any time in which to file a 
bill of exceptions or authorize the filing of a bill of exceptions. 
The order of the court found on Page 10 of the Supplemental 
Bill of Exceptions reads as follows: 
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant 
Paul Schewchuck sho·uld be in the furtherance of justice, 
and he is hereby relieved of any default or apparent default 
in failing to prepare, serve and file his bill of exceptions in 
said case within the time fixed by statute pursuant to the 
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Section 104-14-4, U. C. A., 1943. 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's objec-
tions to the granting of relief as prayed in defendant's 
petition for relief should be and the same hereby are over-
ruled and denied. Dated and signed this 21st day of May, 
1948, john A. Hendricks, judge." 
Now if the court was without jurisdiction to settle the bill 
of exceptions on April 24, 1948, and the bill served upon the 
respondent on that date was a nullity, there was, therefore, in 
effect no bill of exceptions served or filed when the court en-
tered its order on May 21, 1948. 
The records fail to disclose any attempt whatever to serve 
or file a bill of exceptions after the court purportedly relieved 
the appellant of his default. There was no attempt even to make 
a nunc .pro tunc order validating the purported bill of excep-
tions. In substance, therefore, no bill of exceptions has yet been 
served or filed. 
The plaintiff and respondent objected to the purported 
proceedings contained in the Supplemental Bill of Exceptions . 
. We, therefore, submit that the bill of exceptions must be 
stricken because it was not served and filed within the time 
required by law, and there has never been any valid proceed-
ings upon which to ground a claim that the rights of the ap-
pellant to prepare, serve and file his bill of exceptions have 
been revived. 
III. 
THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL BASED 
SOLELY UPON THE JUDGMENT ROLL. 
If the bill of exceptions is stricken, as it must be, then the 
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only think left before the court really is the appellant's general 
demurrer to the respondent's amended and supplemental com-
plaint. On this question the only point argued in appellant's 
brief is that the amended and supplemental complaint is defec- · 
tive in that it does not contain allegations asserting affirma-
tively that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 
That is a strange contention in the face of the allegation 
"that as the plaintiff approached the point where the agent of 
the defendant was cleaning said windows said employee had the 
window cleaner with the long handle extended vertically into 
the air parallel with the window, but as the plaintiff reached a 
point e.ven with the said employee the said agent carelessly, 
recklessly and negligently, without looking and without any 
regard for the safety of pedestrians using the sidewalk and 
particularly for the safety of the plaintiff, suddenly pulled said 
long handled window cleaner down without turning around and 
negligently, recklessly, carelessly and suddenly thrust the 
handle of said window cleaner across the sidewalk so as to sud-
denly project the said handle between the legs of the plaintiff 
and trip her so that she fell to the paved sidewalk with great 
force." 
Certainly it is the law according to the overwhelming 
weight of authority that the plaintiff is not required by affirm-
ative allegations in the complaint to negative the possibility 
of contributory negligence. That is entirely a matter of affirm-
ative defense. 
As stated in 38 Am. jur. 959, 
"According to the practice prevailing in most states, 
the plaintiff in an action for injuries claimed to have been 
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due to the defendant's negligence need not, unless the 
statement of his case indicates probability of contributory 
negligence on his part, allege specifically that he was free 
from negligence at the time of the acts of which complaint 
is made. As it sometimes is expressed, the plaintiff need 
not negative contributory negligence; or ne~d the plaintiff 
allege a want of knowledge of the danger from which his 
injury resulted, for such an allegation is no more than a 
denial of contributory negligence. A motion by the defen-
dant to require the complaint in an action for injuries to 
be made more specific as regards facts which, if incor-
porated in the complaint would have related to the ques-
tion of contributory negligence, is properly denied, for 
contributory negligence is a matter of defense." 
And on page 960 the text continues, 
"The jury, by finding the defendant guilty of negli-
gence, impliedly finds that the plaintiff had no knowledge 
thereof. Thus, it would seem to be sufficient to allege that 
the plaintiff's injury was caused solely by the negligence of 
the defendant. 
"Contributory negligence is a matter of defense, and 
the burden of proving such a defense is on the defendant 
in a personal injury case or in an action to recover for 
wrongful death, and plaintiff's complaint need not show 
freedom from contributory negligence." Michigan C. R. 
Co. v. Spindler, 5 N. E. 2 (d) 632. 
STATEMENT OF CASE ON ASSUMPTION 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS IS NOT STRICKEN 
Now, let us turn to the consideration of the case on the 
theory that the Bill of Exceptions is before the court. 
The appellant devotes the bulk of his brief to an argument 
on contributory negligence. He takes the position not only that 
freedom from contributory negligence must be alleged in the 
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complaint but that the facts in this case clearly indicate con-
tributory negligence. 
However, the defendant in his answer failed to make 
proper allegations of contributory negligence. (See paragraph 
5 of Answer, page 015 judgment roll). 
The test of whether or not a plaintiff is guilty of contribu-
tory negligence is set forth in 38 Am. jur. at 858 where it is 
stated "Negligence is essentially a matter of faulty conduct in 
the manner of acting or in failure to act. A plaintiff is guilty 
of contributory negligence only in so far as he, or some person 
for whose conduct he is responsible, is at fault. A plaintiff's 
right to recover is not affected by his having contributed to 
his injury unless he was in fault in so doing. Fault can be 
predicated upon the plaintiff's' conduct only where such con-
duct was in violation of a duty on his part to exercise care. 
Otherwise stated, there is no negligence without the violation 
of some duty, and there can be no contributory negligence when 
no duty is placed on the plaintiff to exercise care. Contributory 
negligence, it has been said by the courts, is the neglect of the 
duty imposed upon all men to observe ordinary care for their 
own safe.ty. It is the doing of something that a person of or-
dinary prudence would not do, under the circumstances. Be-
fore one can be held to have been guilty of contributo,ry neg-
ligence, the court must find that some specific act or omission 
did not meet the standards exacted by law. Therefore, essen-
tially, contributory negligence is tortious conduct. As herein-
before stated, however, the chain of causation between the de-
fendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury may be broken, 
so that the defendant will be relieved of liability, by an inde-
pendent act of the plaintiff, not within the reasonable contem-
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plation of the defendant, which intervenes as an efficient and 
responsible cause of the injury, irrespective of whether or not 
the plaintiff was at fault." 
What act of negligence on the part of the plaintiff can the 
defendant possible point out? She was walking down a public 
sidewalk. She had a right to assume that other persons using 
the sidewalk would exercise due care. How could she possibly 
anticipate that the agent of the defendant would suddenly 
thrust the long handle of the mop he was using across the side-
walk between her legs so as to trip her. Surely there was 
nothing in the conduct of the defendant's agent when he had 
his long handled mop straight in the air parallel with the window 
to indicate that he would do anything but pull the mop down 
to the sidewalk parallel to the window as proper care re-
quired. 
The defendant has labored hard in his brief to establish a 
showing' of contributory negligence but there is not an iota of 
evidence anywhere in the record to indicate contributory neg-
ligence. As a matter of fact, Archie Hood, who it is stipulated 
was an employee of the defendant and who was handling the 
mop testified that he was using a window cleaner into which 
was fastened a handle 6 feet and 3!4 inches in length. (Tr. 206) 
That he pulled it down in such a way that it tripped Mrs. Spend-
love so that she fell on the sidewalk. He said Mrs. Spendlove 
, wasn't close enough to brush his body and that he first knew 
of the accident when he felt something strike the end of his 
mop handle and then turned around and saw Mrs. Spendlove 
falling to the sidewalk. (Tr. 209-210). 
The issue of contributory negligence was submitted to the 
jury under special interrogatory No. 2 in the following 
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language, "Was the plaintiff Levora Spendlove guilty of con-
tributory negligence that proximately caused the injuries which 
she received on the 3rd day of january, 1947." The answer to 
this was "No." 
The defendant has spent much time in his brief arguing 
the abstract principle of contributory negligence. He cites 
several Montana cases which do not support his position. 
Evidently counsel for the defendant was so convinced 
himself that there was no contributory negligence in the case 
that he didn't make a motion for nonsuit, and never made a 
motion for a new trial, yet now he argues that there is a legal 
presumption of contributory negligence in the case. 
There was nothing presented in the evidence which would 
indicate that the plaintiff should have been aware that she 
was under any degree of danger. 
In conclusion let it be said that the evidence introduced 
at the trial and the cases cited by the defendant in no way 
substantiate the position he has taken that the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory' negligence. This matter was properly 
referred to the jury on the pleadings and evidence in the case 
and the jury has correctly found that there was no contributory 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 
The appellant spends the rest of his brief discussing ques-
tions relating to the earnings of Leland Spendlove, husband of 
the plaintiff, and the question of the evidence of the plaintiff 
concerning her losses resulting from her inability to care for 
her chickens. 
The court did not submit to the jury any issue on the 
earnings of the plaintiff's husband. The evidence relating to 
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the plaintiff's losses in connection with the operation of her 
chicken business and special damages of other types was suf-
ficient to sustain the findings for the jury. (See Tr. pp. 68 to 
71). 
CONCLUSION 
Looking now at the case as a whole, we respectfully submit 
that under the statutes and decided cases of the State of Utah 
there is no theory upon which the appellant's purported bill of 
exceptions can be considered as part of the record. Obviously 
the courf had no jurisdiction to settle the bill on April 24, and 
the filing of the bill in the Supreme Court on May 5, was an 
empty act. There have never been any proper proceedings to 
revive the rights of the appellant to file a bill of exs:eptions; 
no showing has been made of excusable neglect or inadvertence 
and no order has yet been entered fixing any time for the filing 
of a bill of exceptions or authorizing the filing of it. 
Without the bill of exceptions in the record there is really 
nothing before the court for decision. Quite clearly the general 
demurrer of the defendant to the plaintiff's amended and 
supplemental complaint was without merit. 
We have not argued at length concerning the appeal on 
its merits because we are so definitely convinced that the court 
must grant our motion to strike the bill of exceptions. How-
ever, even if the court considers the appeal on its merits, prac-
tically the only ground for reversal urged by the appellant in 
his brief is that the record shows contributory negligence on 
the part of the respondent. The record shows this contention 
to be without merit. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the bill of ex-
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ceptions sho,uld be stricken and the appeal dismissed. If for 
any reason does not grant the motion to strike the bill of ex-
ceptions, we submit that the court should affirm the verdict 
of the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILSON & WILSON, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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